We develop an incomplete markets framework to show that international risk sharing can be low, particularly among countries with large interest-rate differentials. Furthermore, risk sharing computed from asset returns can be consistent with that computed from consumption. The fundamental departure in our paper is that exchange rate growth need not equal the ratio of stochastic discount factors (SDFs), and we develop a restriction that precludes "good deals" in international economies with incomplete markets. Our innovation is to compute the lowest risk sharing consistent with SDFs that (i) are nonnegative, (ii) correctly price returns, and (iii) disallow "good deals."
Introduction
How high is risk sharing in international economies? The bottom line view is spearheaded by Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) , who feature economies in which m(e t+1 /e t )−m ⋆ = 0 (m (respectively, m ⋆ ) is the domestic (foreign) stochastic discount factor, and e t+1 /e t is the growth rate of the exchange rate) and show that the degree of international risk sharing is high. In a potential paradigm shift, we propose an incomplete markets setting in which there is an infinite number of m and m ⋆ pairs that may or may not satisfy m(e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0, and show that international risk sharing can be low, especially among country pairs with large interest-rate differentials.
What is the statement of the international risk sharing puzzle? While imposing m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006, equation (2) 
where Var [·] and Cov [·, ·] denote variance and covariance, respectively, and m and m ⋆ are computed as the minimum variance stochastic discount factors (SDFs) that correctly price the traded assets.
With a 10% exchange rate volatility and a 50% annualized volatility of marginal utility growth in each country, the asset return data implied risk sharing index is 1 − ( 0.1 2 / ( 0.5 2 + 0.5 2 )) = 98%. With volatilities of consumption growth assumed (approximately) equal in each country and correlations between them of around 0.3, they infer risk sharing to be around 30%. The puzzle is that the risk sharing index, based on asset return data, is high, indicating a high degree of risk sharing, whereas the corresponding one based on consumption growth data is low (e.g., Cole and Obstfeld (1991) , Lewis (1996) , and Lewis (2000)).
What do we do differently in this paper? First, we consider a discrete-time economy and a risk , with the understanding that there is an infinite number of SDFs in incomplete markets. Second, unlike most others, we do not assume that m(e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0, and we develop a restriction that precludes "good deals" in international economies with incomplete markets. Specifically, a good deal is the possibility to form a portfolio, which has an implausibly high reward-for-risk. We show that ruling out an implausibly high reward-for-risk in an international Related to our approach, the study of Becker and Hoffmann (2006) argues that the lack of international consumption insurance is, in fact, a failure to insure against permanent fluctuations, whereas insurance against transitory shocks seems almost complete. They favor endogenous market incompleteness, which makes insuring against permanent shocks expensive and hampers international risk sharing. Overall, the work of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) , Lewis (1996) , Lewis (1999), Becker and Hoffmann (2006) , and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) motivate us to formalize the implications of incomplete markets for international risk sharing.
Finally, the studies of Croce (2011, 2013 ) consider a two-country asset pricing model with long-run risk and recursive preferences to reconcile the correlation between asset returns and the correlation between consumption growth. Their model, through the mechanism of a high correlation of the long-run components of consumption growth, produces correlated SDFs, while maintaining a low unconditional correlation between the consumption growth of the two countries.
In contrast, we showcase an incomplete markets setting, and provide evidence that SDFs could share a low correlation between country pairs with high interest-rate differentials.
While many scholars are beginning to expose the consequences of incomplete markets for explaining puzzles in international finance, the adopted approaches are different from ours and interesting in their own right. For example, Lustig and Verdelhan (2015, Proposition 1) leave the home and foreign SDFs unchanged and reconfigure the determination of exchange rates. They conclude that their setup of incomplete markets faces a hurdle addressing exchange rate puzzles. Favilukis, Garlappi, and Neamati (2015) employ restrictions in financial trade to induce market incompleteness, and show that their framework could explain certain facts, including a positive correlation between currency appreciation and consumption growth. The study of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) allows for incomplete markets in their substantive work on international trade and exchange rates.
The novelty of our approach is that we emphasize that there is an infinite number of domestic and foreign SDFs in incomplete markets and, hence, an infinite number of risk sharing indexes. We develop a framework in which SDFs are not unique, and an incomplete markets setting is at the center of a restriction that precludes extremely lucrative trading opportunities.
Our investigation reveals that incomplete markets are relevant to the mechanism by which risks are shared -or not shared -across international borders. 
In the case of complete markets, there is an Arrow-Debreu security tradeable for every time t+1 state of the world, which implies, in the absence of arbitrage, that e t m ⋆ = e t+1 m, or equivalently, we obtain the relation (e.g., Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001, Proposition 1, equation (7))), m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0 in a complete markets setting.
In incomplete markets, some m and m ⋆ satisfy m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0, and some do not.
The statement that "m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ need not equal zero" is intuitive, because, in incomplete markets, there are some outcomes for which no Arrow-Debreu security trades, and different investors will place different marginal utility on those outcomes. For example, if a representative agent exists in each country and if, say, the agent in the domestic country is more risk averse than the foreign counterpart, then the former will assign greater marginal utility to unpalatable states of the world.
We do stress that equations (4) and (5) always hold, regardless of whether the market is complete or incomplete. Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006, Section 1.2) highlight the potential significance of incomplete markets, but in the end their analysis features m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0.
It simplifies the exposition and analytical characterizations if we define (note e t+1 /e t > 0) the
Further, we define
which implies y y ⋆ = m m ⋆ . For later use, observe that y y ⋆ has a bounded expectation, since
Furthermore, from equation (3), it must hold that
Equations (7) and (9) imply that the vector Z can be interpreted as the gross returns in a hypothetical economy in which the gross returns are the geometric average of R and R ⋆ (since equation (7) implies (RR ⋆ ) 1 2 = Z). Further, y and y ⋆ can be interpreted as SDFs in this hypothetical economy.
The transformations in (7) and (8) are merely devices that allow cash flow pricing in a symmetric fashion, circumventing the need to duplicate calculations in different currency units.
If the market were to be complete, equation (6) would imply y = y ⋆ . Further, if the market were to be complete, without loss of generality, we can assume that Arrow-Debreu securities, for every time t + 1 state of the world, trade and then y = y ⋆ is equivalent to saying that domestic investors and foreign investors agree on their prices.
Whether markets are complete or incomplete, domestic investors and foreign investors agree on the prices of securities in the linear span of R (or R ⋆ ). The takeaway is that in incomplete markets, m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ need not equal zero, y need not equal y ⋆ , and the valuations of domestic and foreign investors need not coincide for securities that are not in the linear span of R (or R ⋆ ). 
Motivating a constraint on reward-for-risk in the international economy
where q 0 and q ⋆ 0 are constant scalars and y z and η are random variables that satisfy
The decomposition in equation (10) breaks y and y ⋆ into two components. The first component The discrepancy between valuations of the synthetic security is greater when |q 0 − q ⋆ 0 | is larger, which implies that |y −y ⋆ | is larger and |m (e t+1 /e t )−m ⋆ | is larger. This is a situation that financial intermediaries may, potentially, wish to exploit, and they can do this by creating a synthetic security that offers payoffs outside the linear span of R (or R ⋆ ). Our approach, broadly speaking, is to ask:
By how much can domestic investors and foreign investors diverge on the valuation of securities outside the linear span of R (or R ⋆ ) before financial intermediaries would be presented with a "good deal"? The larger |q 0 − q ⋆ 0 | is, the greater is the potential profit for financial intermediaries.
Hence, we study the consequences of a class of "good deals" characterized by
Specifically, equation (12), in conjunction with (10), translates into two restrictions on y and y * :
We use equations (13) and (14) to rule out implausibly high reward-for-risk strategies in the international economy with incomplete markets.
Consider now a financial intermediary that considers the possibility of privately negotiating a contract between itself and a domestic investor. We assume that the possible opportunity to enter into this private contract does not materially alter m, m ⋆ , R, or R ⋆ .
If entered into, the private contract with the domestic investor would require the investor to buy a synthetic security with payoff x[Z, e t+1 ] in units of domestic currency, at time t + 1, from the financial intermediary, where
Here, w is an N -dimensional vector of portfolio weights in the traded assets assumed to be of the
v, where v ′ 1 = 1. The domestic investor computes the value, at time t, in units of domestic currency, of this synthetic security as: 
where in moving from equation (17) to (18) (7)).
The financial intermediary faces a trade-off between the risks and rewards inherent in the cash flows X. We evaluate this trade-off in the currency units of the hypothetical economy to emphasize symmetry (without repeating the cash flow calculations in different currency units). Then, 
where we have substituted for q, using equation (14). The expression for EP in equation (22) is a measure of the potential reward to the financial intermediary. Analogously, by equation (21)
In words, the incremental variance of X over and above that of the payoff 1 2 q v ′ Z is unity.
The quantity EP/ Roll (1992) , and Grinold and Kahn (2007)) termed the Information Ratio or the Appraisal Ratio (the latter being the term we will use), in that the reward is an excess return and the risk is measured as the square root of the incremental variance over and above that of a risky benchmark (in our setting, this risky benchmark is the portfolio with return 1 2 q v ′ Z). This incremental variance is unity (by equation (23)).
If the reward-for-risk EP were high enough, a financial intermediary would have an incentive to privately negotiate contracts with investors that exploit the fact that domestic and foreign investors disagree on the valuations of securities outside the linear span of R (or R ⋆ ).
We therefore place an upper bound on EP/
, which has the effect of ruling out a potential contract that is too good to be true, i.e., a "good deal" (e.g., Cochrane and Saá-Requejo (2000) ).
Specifically, for some Θ, satisfying 0 ≤ Θ < +∞, the reward-for-risk is bounded:
Alternatively, defining Θ by E t [v ′ Z] Θ ≡ 2 Θ, and substituting into equation (24) and henceforth, for brevity, dropping the subscript t from the expectation operator, we exclude good deals in the international economy by placing an upper bound Θ as follows:
for some economically motivated choice of the Appraisal Ratio Θ (for 0 ≤ Θ < +∞). Moreover, Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) show that the minimum variance m and m ⋆ recovered from asset return data, also satisfy m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0 in an incomplete market. In contrast, we study different choices of m and m ⋆ (restricted by a feasible set outlined shortly) that may or may not be consistent with m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0. Our particular interest is in assessing the prevailing view that international risk sharing is high and that contrasting estimates of risk sharing, from asset return data and from consumption data, constitute a puzzle. Now turn to the question of specifying a risk sharing index. We work in discrete-time, so it is tractable for us to consider covariances between proportional changes, rather than changes in logs of the pricing kernel. This leads us to possibly consider specifying a risk sharing index of the form:
In the setting of incomplete markets, there is an infinite number of m and m ⋆ and, thus, an infinite number of possible values of such a proposed risk sharing index, which leads us to take infimums, over m and m ⋆ , of a risk sharing index in equation (26). Thus, we ask what is a plausible, but economically justified, lower bound for the risk sharing index based on asset return data?
To operationalize our choice of the risk sharing index using asset return data, we compute the risk sharing index in equation (26). Recalling from equation (8) 
subject to
y ≥ 0 and y
In Problem 1, the inequality constraint (28) In the objective function (27), we essentially compute a lower bound on the value of the numerator of equation (26) 
Still, the optimization problem could become ill-posed if one could find m and m ⋆ , where the objective is unbounded. Such an outcome is disallowed with our constraints and via E[yy * ] < +∞.
The solution depends critically on
We use the minimizing y and y ⋆ in Problem 1. Then we use equation (8) to compute m and m ⋆ , which we insert into equation (26) to compute the risk sharing index.
Observe further that if, instead, we were to minimize the ratio 2 Cov [m,
subject to the constraints in equations (28) through (30), we would obtain a value of the risk sharing index that is (weakly) lower than that obtained from Problem 1. Hence, the solution to Problem 1 could be viewed as a conservative lower bound on international risk sharing.
Our goal in computing the risk sharing index RSI in equation (26) is not to establish that values obtained from (26) are identical to, or even close to, those obtained from consumption data.
Instead, our key insight is to show that there may be (m,m ⋆ ) pairs that have low correlations (or covariances), that generate an RSI that is not necessarily inconsistent with those computed from consumption growth data, implying that international risk sharing can, in some cases, be low.
Solving the problem
Based on the problem in equations (27)- (30), we look for solutions for y and y ⋆ of the form:
where y z ≥ 0, η, d, and d * are yet to be determined (the conjectured solution inherits the form in equation (10) 
Because
With the conjectured forms of y and y ⋆ in equation (31)
Exploiting this feature of the solution, we sequentially solve for y z , then for η and, finally, for d and d ⋆ . We first, determine y z by solving:
Here, y z can be interpreted as the minimum second moment stochastic discount factor with nonnegativity in the hypothetical economy in which gross returns are Z.
Introduce an N -dimensional vector of Lagrange multipliers λ. Then the solution to the problem in equation (34) is the solution to:
The first-order condition implies 0 = 2y z − 2λ ′ Z. Both the first-order condition and the constraint y z ≥ 0 will be satisfied if y z = max(λ ′ Z, 0). Then, substituting and simplifying, the solution to (34) is the solution to
Next, to solve for η, we note that η is proportional to e z , where e z is the residual from the projection of one onto the space of returns Z. Hence, e z can be computed from the Ordinary Least Squares regression formula (e.g., Cochrane (2005, page 95) ). Then η is obtained by multiplicatively scaling e z in such a way that E[η 2 ] = 1. More formally,
In the degenerate case that e z = 0, in every state, we set η = 0. 
These values for d and d ⋆ , together with equations (36) and (37) Note that the original equations (27)- (30) Additionally, we solve a particularly parameterized economy with five states of the world in the Internet Appendix (Section I and Table Internet-I) , which helps to synthesize, in a simplified setting, the various elements of our approach to study international risk sharing under incomplete markets.
What does our approach tell us about risk sharing?
Our empirical investigation employs a risk-free bond and a broad-based equity index denominated in each currency for ten countries -namely, Australia (AUD), New Zealand (NZD), United Kingdom (STG), France (FRA), Canada (CAD), United States (USD), Netherlands (NLG), Germany (GER), Japan (JPY), and Switzerland (SWI).
When computing, for example, the risk sharing index for the US and Australia, the gross return vector R includes real returns on four assets, namely, on the US risk-free bond, on the US equity index, on the Australian risk-free bond and on the Australian equity index, all denominated in US dollars, while R ⋆ includes returns on the same four assets, but now all the real returns are denominated in Australian dollars.
The country-specific data on the LIBOR interest-rate, equity index, currency, and inflation are described in Appendix B.
Risk sharing is high across all country pairs when
To benchmark our analysis, we first compute the risk sharing index of Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006, equation (17)) and report the values in Panel A of (25) wilcoxon") are all 0.000, indicating that there is a significant difference between the two risk sharing index distributions. The takeaway is that relaxing the constraint m(e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ = 0 translates into less correlated m and m ⋆ pairs, resulting in lower estimates of the risk sharing index.
Risk sharing is low across country pairs with high interest-rate differentials
when m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ ̸ = 0 The constraint E[(y − y ⋆ ) 2 ] ≤ Θ 2 , in equation
Squaring the evidence on risk sharing from consumption and asset returns
How do the estimates of international risk sharing recovered from asset return data compare to the ones from real consumption growth?
To establish our own estimates of the risk sharing based on consumption growth, we follow Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006, equation (23)), and replace the variances and covariances of the SDFs with variances and covariances of changes in log consumption:
The values of risk sharing, RSI C , reported in Panel A of Table 2 , use annual consumption growth data from Barro and Ursua (2008) , updated using World Development Indicators. Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2006) describe as a puzzle the fact that their values of the risk sharing index, based on asset return data, are much higher than those based on consumption growth data. In order to reconcile estimates of risk sharing from asset returns with those from consumption growths, a key step is to recognize that m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ need not equal zero.
With our methodology (equations (26) and (27) this reward-for-risk, is instrumental in lowering the risk sharing index, implied from asset return data, sufficiently to be able to align it with that computed from consumption data.
The big picture is that it is possible to reconcile the estimates of risk sharing from consumption data with those from asset returns. Moreover, the most pessimistic estimates of risk sharing obtained from asset returns can be lower than that from consumption data (for example, in 24 out of 45 instances, when Θ = 0.65), potentially reversing the order of the risk sharing puzzle.
Low risk sharing index is accompanied by reasonable volatility of SDFs
One may surmise that a low value of the risk sharing index could be due to the high volatility of the domestic and foreign country SDFs, which enter into the denominator of equation (26). Adopting a higher value of the Appraisal Ratio Θ, in equation (25), increases the volatility of y and y ⋆ (see equation (31)), and, thus, likely increases the volatility of m and m ⋆ . Thus, a potentially important question is: Are the SDFs unrealistically volatile in our incomplete markets setting?
To address the aforementioned question, we compute and display in Table 3 Table 2 convey the same message. We recall that for the value of Θ = 0.65 (as in Table 2 ), we cannot reject the null that the distribution of risk sharing obtained using asset returns is the same as the distribution of risk sharing obtained using consumption growth.
Further evidence of our SDFs having realistic properties is that, for the values of Θ in Table 1 , the nonnegativity constraints y ≥ 0 and y ⋆ ≥ 0 happen not to be binding, suggesting that, in practice, m and m ⋆ are strictly positive, a feature also illustrated in the context of Table Internet-I and Section I of the Internet Appendix.
Synthesizing and understanding the patterns of international risk sharing
In Panels A of 
Replacing conditional by unconditional expectations and using an approximation to go from logs to levels and vice versa, Cov t [ln(m), ln(m ⋆ )], appearing in the third line of equation (40), is approximately proportional to the risk sharing index. If the domestic currency is Japanese yen and the foreign currency is Australian dollar, then ceteris paribus the expected excess return to borrowing in Japanese yen and investing in Australian dollar can be higher when the risk sharing index is lower. This provides some rationale for what we observe in the data.
Both approaches, that is, those from asset returns and real consumption growth data, reinforce the notion of low risk sharing, especially among country pairs with high interest-rate differentials. 2
Summary and conclusions
In contrast to the literature, we find that estimates of international risk sharing can be low, especially for pairs of countries that have large interest-rate differentials. Further, risk sharing computed from asset return data need not be inconsistent with that computed from consumption growth data.
Our conclusions are based on consumption and asset return data, spanning nearly 40 years, for ten industrialized countries.
The key issue that drives the difference from the extant literature is that we do not require that exchange rate growth be the ratio of stochastic discount factors. Instead, we develop a restriction that precludes "good deals" in international economies with incomplete markets. We present the lowest risk sharing index consistent with stochastic discount factors that are nonnegative, that correctly price asset returns in both countries, and that rule out "good deals." Our work highlights the role of incomplete financial markets in understanding extant puzzles in international finance. 
while E[m ⋆ / (e t+1 /e t ) − m] = 0 implies (i.e., Balakrishnan and Lai (2009, equation (11.69) , page 526)):
Further,
and also,
or E[y − y ⋆ ] = 0. Our assertion is proved. 
Or,
We further note that 
B Appendix B: Data description and sources
We obtain monthly data from January 1975 to June 2014 for the following ten countries: Australia (AUD), New Zealand (NZD), United Kingdom (STG), France (FRA), Canada (CAD), United
States (USD), Netherlands (NLG), Germany (GER), Japan (JPY), and Switzerland (SWI).
The nominal returns of bonds, equity indexes, and currencies are converted into real returns by adjusting by ex-post realized inflation. (2004)). The data is at monthly frequency.
Exchange rates:
The spot exchange rate data for all country pairs is the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes (from Datastream). The exchange rates for France, Germany, and Netherlands from January 1999 (the introduction of the Euro) onward are taken to be the relevant fixed conversion rate to the Euro (e.g., DM 1.95583 = 1 Euro). The reported risk sharing index RSI (in %) in Panel A is based on the methodology of Brandt, Cochrane, and SantaClara (2006, equation (17) , Table 2 ). The reported risk sharing index RSI (in %) in Panel B is based on equation (26) for various Appraisal Ratios Θ. When computing, for example, the risk sharing index for JPY/AUD, R includes returns on four assets, namely, on the Japanese risk-free bond, on the Japanese equity index, on the Australian risk-free bond, and on the Australian equity index, all denominated in Japanese yen, while R ⋆ includes returns on the same four assets but now all the returns are denominated in Australian dollars. There are ten countries and the sample period is January 1975 to June 2014. CI l and CIu, respectively, represent the 90% lower and upper bootstrap confidence intervals. We report the estimates of risk sharing, RSI C , based on equation (39), which uses real consumption growth data. Reported also is the risk sharing index, RSI, that are based on equation (26) The three countries with the highest interest-rates are Australia (AUD), New Zealand (NZD), and United Kingdom (STG), and the three countries with the lowest interest-rates are Germany (GER), Japan (JPY), and Switzerland (SWI). 
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Abstract
This internet appendix provides additional theoretical and empirical results. The thrust of Section I is an example economy in which m (e t+1 /e t ) − m ⋆ need not be zero in each state of the world, and the domestic country has low interest-rates, while the foreign country has high interest-rates.
We describe the parameterized economy with five states and the results on risk sharing index in Table Internet-I . Next, Section II shows a relation between the excess return to borrowing in domestic currency and investing in foreign currency, to risk sharing. Table Internet -II displays the summary statistics on interest-rates, equity returns, and inflation across our sample of ten countries, whereas Table Internet-III provides the Appraisal Ratios for a strategy in which the domestic investor invests in the foreign equity index. The highest Appraisal Ratio is 0.26, which helps to benchmark our choice of Appraisal Ratios used in the study. The economy is constructed to capture some relevant features. First, the domestic country supports a low risk-free interest-rate (say, Japan), whereas the foreign country (say, Australia) a high risk-free interest rate. Second, the returns of the risky asset (i.e., equity) display positive correlation.
Our objective is to illustrate the solution technique and highlight the volatilities and covariance between m and m ⋆ . We also compute the extent of risk sharing. We further show that the problem is well-posed with a finite objective and well-defined Lagrange multipliers, and the solution supports m > 0 and m ⋆ > 0 over a wide range of values of Θ.
We compute e z by solving equation (37) 
where we use a subscript t to denote time t conditional expectation.
We recognize ln
is the expected (log) excess return to a trade, which borrows one unit of domestic currency at time t, sells it for foreign currency, holds the foreign currency until time t + 1, and then liquidates the position. The next step is to use the identity:
Rearranging equation (B2), we then have
Writing equation (B1) as: 
Going from conditional to unconditional expectations, Cov[ln(m), ln(m ⋆ )] is, loosely speaking, proportional to RSI in equation (26). This possibly suggests the following: If the domestic currency is Japanese yen and the foreign currency is Australian dollar, then ceteris paribus the expected excess return to borrowing in Japanese yen and investing in Australian dollar is higher when the risk sharing index is lower. ♣ In our illustrative calculations, the domestic country is Japan (with a low risk-free interest-rate), and the foreign country is Australia (with a high risk-free interest-rate). The exchange rate growth e t+1 /e t is denominated in |AD. We follow the steps in Subsection 2.4 and compute e z by solving equation (37) where Requity and R ⋆ equity , respectively, are the domestic and foreign equity index returns, measured in their own currencies. The Appraisal Ratio of this strategy is computed using the domestic equity index as the benchmark:
To clarify the reported Appraisal Ratios below, the currency of the domestic investor is specified by the rows, while the currency of the foreign investor is specified by the first column. As an example of how to read the entries in the We report the summary statistics for real consumption growth (annualized and in percentage units). AR 1 represents the first-order autocorrelation. We also report the correlation between country consumption growth and country real equity returns, and between country consumption growth and OECD consumption growth. The consumption growth data is from Barro and Ursua (2008) , updated using World Development Indicators. The data on OECD consumption growth is from Datastream. There are ten countries in our sample: Australia (AUD), New Zealand (NZD), United Kingdom (STG), France (FRA), Canada (CAD), United States (USD), Netherlands (NLG), Germany (GER), Japan (JPY), and Switzerland (SWI).
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